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Dear Editor,
In the current issue of NeuroImage, two Event-Related Potential
(ERP) studies of recognition memory for faces are published back-
to-back (Curran and Hancock, and MacKenzie and Donaldson).
Both studies suggest that qualitatively distinct retrieval processes
support recognition, consistent with “dual-process” models of
recognition memory. However, the studies do so on the basis of
apparently different results, a discrepancy that is surprising given
the similarity of their designs. Here we place the studies in context,
and highlight potential reasons for the discrepancy.
Dual-process theories of recognition memory postulate two
qualitatively different processes: recollection, which is associated
with the retrieval of contextual information that accompanied prior
exposure to a stimulus, and familiarity, which is an impression of
oldness engendered by a stimulus that does not include the retrieval
of contextual information about its prior exposure. A common
example is the “Butcher-on-the-Bus” phenomenon, where some-
one's face on a bus can seem highly familiar (because they are, for
example, your local butcher), yet you cannot recollect who they
are, or when you last saw them. Many previous ERP studies of
recognition memory, using a variety of stimuli, have provided
evidence supporting dissociable neural correlates of recollection
and familiarity. A mid-frontal effect occurs circa 300–500 ms post
stimulus (the “FN400”) and is thought to reflect familiarity,
whereas a left parietal effect occurs later, circa 500–700 ms, and is
thought to reflect recollection. The findings of Yovel and Paller
(2004), also published in NeuroImage (21: 789–800) called this
view into question, based on the demonstration of a single
posterior ERP difference between correctly recognised “old”
(previously seen) faces and correctly rejected “new” (previously
unseen) faces, regardless of whether or not contextual information
(that was explicitly paired with the old faces) was retrieved. In
other words, no neural evidence was found to support the
phenomenological distinction between whether you do or do not
recollect that a face belongs to your butcher. By this view,
familiarity and recollection do not reflect qualitatively distinct
processes, at least for faces. Instead, consistent with a single
process model, Yovel Paller argued that the neural processes
supporting familiarity and recollection are the same (i.e., differing
only in degree, rather than kind).1053-8119/$ - see front matter © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc.
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.12.049TE
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participants studied a series of faces, each paired with a specific
piece of contextual information. In a subsequent recognition test,
participants discriminated old from new faces, and if faces were
recognised, were required to report accompanying contextual
information if possible. Curran and Hancock report results that are
consistent with the traditional view, in which the mid-frontal ERP
effect was observed for recognized faces regardless of whether or
not associated contextual details were recalled, whereas the parietal
effect was present only when contextual details were recalled. By
contrast, MacKenzie and Donaldson found that faces recognised
without retrieval of contextual information elicited a posterior old/
new effect, and this posterior effect was larger when contextual
detail was reported, but in this case, was accompanied by an
additional anterior old/new effect. The latter study replicates the
pattern of effects shown by Yovel and Paller over posterior scalp,
but the additional anterior effect associated with recollection is
new. Thus the two studies in the current issue stand together in
rejecting the single-process view of recognition memory for faces,
but do so on the basis of divergent findings within what are, prima
facie, very similar paradigms.
What then are the differences between the two current studies
that might explain the discrepant results? A number of experi-
mental differences are unlikely to be important. For example, the
studies vary in the requirement to recall names versus occupations,
and in the use of 24 versus 12 stimuli in each study list, neither of
which would appear to be important on the basis of comparison
across the three studies. Similarly, Curran and Hancock were
concerned about differences in response demands across ‘new’,
‘familiar’ and ‘recollected’ conditions, but showed that this does
not provide an explanation of the qualitative changes in activity
across conditions.
There are three differences between the studies that might be
important. First, is the fact that behavioural performance differs
considerably; compared to both MacKenzie and Donaldson and
Yovel and Paller, participants in the Curran and Hancock study
were better able to discriminate old from new items overall. This
difference in performance may relate to the discrepant ERP effects.
However, rather than providing a direct causal explanation,
differences in discriminability are probably better viewed as a
by-product of other experimental variables that are critical.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSA second potentially important difference is the heterogeneity
of the faces used; both MacKenzie and Donaldson and Yovel and
Paller employed stimuli that were relatively homogenous (with the
intention of carefully matching and controlling for unwanted
variability), whereas Curran and Hancock employed a more
heterogeneous stimulus set (with the intention of maximizing
familiarity-based discrimination because familiarity is well known
to provide limited discrimination between studied items and similar
lures). Unfortunately however, it is not immediately clear what
effect this heterogeneity should have: from a dual-process
perspective, making faces more homogenous has been argued to
reduce the extent to which familiarity serves as an effective basis
for performance. By this account, only in Curran and Hancock's
study could participants employ familiarity as a basis for
discriminating between old and new faces. Alternatively, increas-
ing heterogeneity might increase the ability to recollect information
(in addition to study context), suggesting the opposite bias, with
participants in MacKenzie and Donaldson's study relying more on
familiarity-based retrieval. Direct experimental manipulation of
stimulus heterogeneity will be important for future studies.
The third difference between the studies concerns the modality
of the contextual information. MacKenzie and Donaldson (andUN
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Yovel and Paller) paired faces with auditory information, whereas
Hancock and Curran paired faces with visual information. This
suggests that the nature of the representations of the study episodes
may differ, which could explain the differences in the neural
correlates that each set of authors associated with recollection.
However, the more important difference between the studies
concerns the pattern of effects evoked by the putative ‘familiarity’
conditions, in which participants were unable to report the
associated contextual information, so it is not immediately clear
why the modality of that information is relevant.
While the above procedural differences between the two studies
would normally be considered minor, they may offer important
clues to new variables that are critical for recognition memory. This
is ultimately an empirical question. It is an important question
nonetheless because, while the debate between single- and dual-
process models of recognition memory has been raging for several
decades, mainly on the basis of behavioural data, the neural data
from ERP studies has provided the clearest evidence in support of
dual-process models (arguably clearer than data from fMRI). The
present studies bolster this evidence, but also illustrate that we have
more to learn about the factors that affect the neural correlates of
recollection and familiarity.TE
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